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Identical coursesApplied Game Theory and Economics of Information (B-KUL-D0M59B)
Cannot be taken as part of an examination contract
Crombez Christophe (coordinator) | Crombez Christophe | Seldeslachts Jo Aims
Upon completion of this course, the student is able to:
Applied Game theory
- critically assess scientific research, using game theoretical models.
- apply game theory to bargaining, entry deterrence and repeated games.
- develop game-theoretical models.
Economics of Information
- provide an overview of the principal solution concepts and applications of game theory, with a focus on situations with asymmetric information.
- critically assess existing scientific research.
- formulate research questions and conduct research independently.
- demonstrate team work and presentation skills
Previous knowledge
We recommend the following course units should be successfully completed:
Theory of Industrial Organization and/or Applied Industrial Organization
Is included in these courses of study
- Doctoral Programme in Business Economics (Leuven)
- Master in de toegepaste economische wetenschappen (Leuven) 60 ects.
- Master in de toegepaste economische wetenschappen (Leuven) (Minor: Strategie en innovatie) 60 ects.
- Master handelsingenieur (Leuven) 120 ects.
- Master handelsingenieur (Leuven) (Minor: International business, strategie en innovatie) 120 ects.
- Master of Business Economics (Leuven) 60 ects.
- Master of Business Economics (Leuven) (Minor 1: Strategy and Innovation) 60 ects.
- Master of Business Engineering (Leuven) 120 ects.
- Master of Business Engineering (Leuven) (Minor: International Business, Strategy and Innovation) 120 ects.
- Courses for Exchange Students Faculty of Economics and Business (Leuven)
Activities
3 ects. Applied Game Theory (B-KUL-D0M59a)
Content
This course offers an overview of the principal solution concepts and applications of game theory. Game theory is used in the social sciences to analyze strategic interactions in a variety of contexts. The actions taken by others, competitors, buyers, suppliers, regulators and such, affect companies' market and non-market opportunities. When making decisions companies thus need to anticipate the actions taken by others. Game theory is the methodological tool best suited at analyzing such interactions. The course consists of two parts. First, it introduces the principal solution concepts used in game theoretical models: the Nash equilibrium concept, sub-game perfection, and sequential equilibria. Next, it studies applications of game theory in a number of areas, such as bargaining, signaling, spatial models. Both static and dynamic settings are analyzed.
Course material
Required reading:
- Reader: Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Chapters 11-15, Ekonomika.
- Additional course material (such as slides, homework) is distributed via Toledo.
Toledo:
- Toledo is being used for this learning activitity.
Format: more information
The teaching philosophy for this course is partly based on lectures and partly based on active discussion in class. For this purpose, students need to make an assignment before each class. Each class consists then of two parts. In the first part, the assignment is discussed. In the second part, a particular concept or application of game theory is explained and applied by means of exercises.
Is also included in other courses
3 ects. Economics of Information (B-KUL-D0M91a)
Content
The area of information economics has been a rapidly growing area in economics in the last decades. Most of what the module studies involves situations of asymmetric information, that is, situations where one economic agent knows something that another economic agent doesn't. For example, a worker might have a better idea of his capabilities than his employer does, managers know more about investment prospects than stockholders or investors. This asymmetric information typically leads to economic inefficiencies. Two situations are distinguished: moral hazard (a situation where the information on actions to be taken by the agent is asymmetrically distributed) and adverse selection (a situation when the information on types/characteristics is asymmetrically distributed). Solutions to these problems, like incentive contracts, are extensively being investigated in the literature. Also the best informed agent could try to signal this information before the contract is signed (signalling) or after the contract is signed (screening). In a dynamic setting, when current player's action determine future player's beliefs, reputation building scenarios can be developed. Many applications exist in IO, management, finance, accounting, insurance and marketing.
Course material
Required reading:
- Textbook: Perez-Castrillo & Macho-Stadler, Economics of Information, Oxford University Press
- Additional course material (slides, articles,...) is distributed via Toledo.
Toledo:
Toledo is being used for this learning activitity.
Format: more information
The teaching philosophy for this course is partly based on lectures and partly based on active discussion in class. For this purpose, students need to make an assignment in teams before each class. Each class consists then of two parts. In the first part, a particular theory of economics of information is explained. In the second part, the assignment is discussed.
Is also included in other courses
Evaluation
Evaluation: Applied Game Theory and Economics of Information (B-KUL-D2M59b)
Explanation
Features of the evaluation
* The evaluation for this course consists of:
- Class participation and preparation: students need to make individual and group assignments before each class and these assignments will be discussed during the class
- A team paper
- A group presentation of the team paper in which each team member has to do an equal part of the presentation
- A written, open book exam.
*Deadlines will be determined by the lecturer and communicated via Toledo.
Determination of grades
*The grades are determined by the lecturer, as announced via Toledo and the examination schedule. The result is computed and expressed as a whole number on a scale of 20.
*The final grade is a weighted score and consists of:
- Class participation and preparation: 5% of the final grade
- Paper: 25% of the final grade
- Presentation: 25% of the final grade
- Exam: 45% of the final grade
* If the student does not participate at the exam, the final grade for the course will be NA (not taken). If the student does not participate in one (or more) of the other partial evaluations, the grades for these partial evaluations will be a 0-grade within the calculations of the final grade for the course.
*If one of the set deadlines was not respected, the grade for that respective part will be a 0-grade in the final grade, unless the student asked the lecturer to arrange a new deadline. This request needs to be motivated by grave circumstances.
Second exam opportunity
*At the second exam opportunity, the final grade is a weighted score and consists of
- Class participation and preparation: 5% of the final grade
- Paper: 25% of the final grade
- Presentation: 25% of the final grade
- Exam: 45% of the final grade
*Due to the nature of the class participation and preparation, students cannot retake this part of the evaluation. The grade attained at the first examination opportunity will therefore be transferred to the second examination opportunity.
*Students who failed the exam but passed the paper and presentation, only need to retake the exam. The result for the paper and presentation obtained at the first exam opportunity will be transferred to the second exam opportunity.
*Students who passed the exam but failed the paper and/or presentation, only need to retake the paper and presentation (= correct the paper and present it again, both need to be done by the individual student). The result for the exam obtained at the first exam opportunity will be transferred to the second exam opportunity.
*Students who failed both the exam and the paper and/or presentation, need to retake both the exam and the paper and presentation (= correct the paper and present it again, both need to be done by the individual student).